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Social Mobility and Equality of Opportunity





adies and gentlemen, director, colleagues and friends: it is a great honour
and a pleasure to be asked to deliver this year’s Geary lecture, coming, as
it does, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Economic and Social
Research  Institute (ESRI). Over the years many eminent economists and
sociologists have given the Geary lecture, but I believe that I am one of the few
who knew Roy Geary personally because we were colleagues here during the
last few years of his life. 
Roy Geary was the most eminent Irish statistician of the 20th century. But
during the short time in which I knew him he was less concerned with
statistical problems and more with the social problems of contemporary
Ireland. So I hope that the topic of my lecture is one that Roy would have
found both intellectually interesting and of some practical relevance. 
For a large part of my professional life I have worked on social mobility
and so it will come as no surprise that this is the topic of my talk. Recently,
governments and political parties have discovered, or rediscovered, social
mobility and in some cases they have made its promotion a central theme in
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01 Breen article_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 413policy. For example, in January the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,
gave a speech in which he said:
… social mobility will be our theme for the coming election and the coming
parliamentary term. Social mobility will be our focus, not instead of social
justice, but because social mobility is modern social justice.
The idea of social mobility is closely linked to the concept of equality of
opportunity: it is widely held that if there were greater equality of opportunity
there would be more social mobility and, conversely, that more social mobility
indicates greater equality of opportunity. In my view this argument is false
and so, in my lecture today I want to talk about what we know about social
mobility, what we might mean by equality of opportunity and why, despite the
claims made by politicians and sometimes by social scientists, social mobility
is not a yardstick of equality of opportunity.
II  TWO KINDS OF INEQUALITY
In discussions of inequality by philosophers and social scientists, a
distinction is commonly made between two kinds of equality: “equality of
outcomes (or condition)” and “equality of opportunity”. The difference between
them can be illustrated by a simple example. Imagine that I had $1,000 and I
divided it equally between everyone in this room: then we would have equality
of outcomes. But if, instead, I gave everyone a lottery ticket and then drew a
ticket at random and gave the holder of that ticket the whole $1,000, we would
certainly not have equality of outcomes but we would have equality of
opportunity: since everyone had a lottery ticket, everyone had the same
chance of success. 
When we turn to the question of the distribution of rewards in society at
large, we find that people in developed societies have a strong preference for
equality of opportunity over equality of outcome. When they are asked, the
great majority of people disagree with a statement like: “The fairest way of
distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares”. But
when given the statement: “It’s fair if people have more money or wealth, but
only if there are equal opportunities” many more people agree than disagree.
In Britain, the USA, and Germany, over 70 per cent more people agree than
disagree with that statement (Marshall, Swift and Roberts, 1999, p. 246). In a
recent US poll (Opinion Poll on Economic Mobility and the American Dream,
Pew Charitable Trust, March 2009), when asked whether it was “… more
important for this country to reduce inequality in America or to ensure
everyone has a fair chance of improving their economic standing”, 71 per cent
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thought it was more important to reduce inequality.
In recent years the politics of inequality have come more into line with the
views of the general public: political parties and governments in most western
developed nations now give much less weight to policies seeking to equalise
inequalities of income and wealth and more to policies that address
inequalities of opportunity. One measure of the degree to which governments
have relinquished the idea of equalising outcomes is the falling top rate of
income tax: in the US in the 1970s the top rate was 70 per cent and today it is
half of that. The redistribution of incomes or wealth is no longer a goal: instead
the goal is meritocracy, in which rewards are indeed unequal, but are
nevertheless legitimate, in part because individuals are given equal chances
to acquire them.1
Although people in many countries believe that both equality of opportunity
and meritocracy are desirable, there is a lot of variation between countries in
the extent to which people believe that these goals have been attained. As we
might expect, Americans are the strongest believers that their own society is
meritocratic: on average, Americans consider individual effort a much
stronger determinant of whether or not someone succeeds than the economic
circumstances in which he or she grew up. In other countries, like Britain,
there is much more scepticism: indeed, in Britain a majority believes that
people do not have equal opportunities to get ahead.
How would one measure the degree to which opportunities are equally or
unequally distributed? The most common way has been to look at social
mobility, and, in several countries, social mobility has now come to occupy a
central place in political debate (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2007). Rates of
social mobility have come to be a yardstick by which government policies to
further equality of opportunity are to be judged. In Britain a discussion paper
written for the Cabinet Office in 2001 put this quite bluntly: “lack of social
mobility”, the author wrote, “implies inequality of opportunity” (Aldridge,
Stephen, 2001, “Social Mobility: a discussion paper”, UK Cabinet Office,
available at www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/socialmobility.pdf.). Indeed, it may seem
unproblematic to argue that if there is more social mobility there must be
more equal opportunities. Social scientists themselves have said, or, at any
rate, implied as much, by equating social mobility with equality of opportunity.
For example, one of my Geary lecture predecessors, Gary Becker, wrote in his
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a given family in different generations has usually been known as inter  -
generational mobility … or equality of opportunity”. (Becker, 1981, p. 143). 
In my talk today, I shall argue that the claim that social mobility measures
equality of opportunity is insufficiently attentive to the causes of social
mobility and to what equality of opportunity might mean. Once we pay close
attention to these two things we will see that there is, in fact, no straight  -
forward relationship between equality of opportunity and social mobility. 
III SOCIAL  MOBILITY
When we talk about social mobility we usually mean intergenerational
social mobility, comparing an individual’s circumstances with the
circumstances of the family in which he or she was raised. Social mobility is a
topic of interest to economists as well as sociologists, but there are some
differences in how they approach it. For sociologists, the relevant circum  -
stances that we want to compare are measured in terms of occupation or social
class and so the study of intergenerational mobility involves the comparison of
a person’s social class with that of the family in which he or she grew up. In
this case we often speak of class destinations and class origins. Economists, on
the other hand, measure circumstances in terms of income or earnings and so
they focus on intergenerational income or earnings mobility. The information
used almost always relates to men and typically involves comparing a man’s
average income over several years with a similar average of the income of his
father. Ideally, the span of years across which the average is calculated is quite
long, and covers the same age range for father and son. So, one might compare
the average income of a man between the ages of 35 and 45 years with the
average income of his father when he was between 35 and 45 years old. 
The economists’ approach yields single number measures of mobility – or,
to be exact, of immobility. One of these is referred to as the intergenerational
elasticity, and it tells us the percentage difference that we should expect in
sons’ incomes for a given percentage difference in their fathers’ incomes. So if
the elasticity is 0.4, a 10 per cent difference in fathers’ incomes translates into
a 4 per cent difference, on average, in sons’ incomes. A high value of the
elasticity means that there is little mobility, in the sense that a son’s income
is closely related to the income of his father. The intergenerational correlation
is another measure that tells us, on a scale from zero to one, how strong the
relationship is between a man’s income and the income of his father, with
higher values reflecting a stronger link.
The elasticity is a relative measure because it tells us how parental income
predicts one’s own relative position in the income distribution, rather than
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widely between different countries. The elasticity is particularly low – and so
mobility is relatively high – in the Scandinavian countries, and it is high – and
so mobility is low – in both Britain and the US. One question that interests
economists and sociologists is whether there is a relationship between the
degree of inequality in the distribution of income in a society – as measured by
the Gini index, for example – and the extent of intergenerational mobility. One
motivation for this interest is the US case. It has long been believed that
although there is a good deal more inequality in the US than in most
comparable societies, there is also more mobility and so everyone has a better
chance of reaching the top (or falling to the bottom, though that is less often
remarked on). Unfortunately, for those who believe in this particular aspect of
the American Dream, it seems not to be the case: the US has indeed a great
deal of inequality in the distribution of income, but it also has less mobility
than most other countries. Comparing the US with Sweden, inequality in
disposable income is about 50 per cent greater in the US (the US Gini is
around 0.3, the Swedish Gini around 0.2) and immmobility in the US is almost
twice what it is in Sweden (the US elasticity is over 0.4, in Sweden it is a little
over 0.2). So rather than high inequality in the US being offset by high
mobility, these two things reinforce each other: inequality in the US is both
higher and more persistent across generations than in most other developed
countries. 
In contrast to economists, sociologists usually look at mobility between
social classes. Social classes are groups of occupations put together because
they are thought to be similar in important ways. Sociologists use two kinds
of measures of intergenerational mobility – absolute and relative. The relative
measures, similar to the elasticity used by economists, tell us how strongly
parental social class predicts the social class in which a child will be located
when he or she is an adult. Sociologists sometimes call this social fluidity and
a situation in which child’s social class does not depend at all on parent’s class
is called perfect mobility. Although no society comes close to displaying perfect
mobility, societies with high social fluidity are closer to it, having a weak
relationship between the class position of parents and their children.
Measures of absolute mobility, on the other hand, capture whether people are
higher up or lower down in the class hierarchy than their parents. This
involves a simple comparison between a person’s social class and the one he or
she was born into, whereas relative measures ask whether a person’s position
relative to other people, is better or worse than his/her parents position was
relative to other families. 
Suppose that my father was a clerk and that I am a manager: then, in
absolute terms I have been upwardly mobile. But suppose that, in my father’s
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of the population, whereas, in my generation, being a manager puts me in a
position which is better than, say, 40 per cent of the population. Then, in
relative terms I have been downwardly mobile because my rank is worse than
my father’s: half of the population were in a better position than him whereas
60 per cent are in a better class position than me, and this is so even though I
have an objectively better class position than he had. This discrepancy
between absolute and relative mobility might seem far-fetched, but it is
actually quite the opposite. When there has been a large upward shift in the
distribution of class positions such a discrepancy will be common. 
We can make the same distinction when we look at income mobility.
Recent US data show that two-thirds of Americans earn more, in real terms,
than their parents did, and so they have been upwardly mobile in the absolute
sense. But of these, only half of them, or one-third of all Americans, have been
upwardly mobile in the relative sense – because they are higher up the income
distribution than their parents were. The other half of the absolutely
upwardly mobile have either been immobile or downwardly mobile in relative
terms.
IV  TRENDS IN SOCIAL FLUIDITY
Sociologists have found that relative class mobility varies quite a lot
between countries, with Scandinavia once again showing the greatest relative
mobility and countries like Germany, Italy, France and Ireland the least. So,
happily, variations between countries in relative mobility chances seem fairly
similar, irrespective of whether we focus on income or class position.2 One
advantage that sociologists enjoy over economists is that they can also
examine long-term temporal trends in relative mobility chances, simply
because it is easier to find out someone’s parental class than to find out their
parental income. The major trend is a quite widespread tendency towards
more social fluidity in most European countries during the course of the 20th
century. In other words, a person’s class has gradually come to depend less on
the class occupied by his or her parents.3
418 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
2 Some analyses find that social fluidity in the US is high, on a par with that found in Sweden.
This contrasts with the situation in respect of income mobility: proponents of the American dream
might find some comfort in this. But other analyses (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1985) put US
fluidity on a par with that found in Britain, and thus at the lower end of the range.
3 The United States has followed a different path. In the late 19th and early 20th century, relative
mobility rates were much higher than they were in the mid-late 20th century (Ferrie, 2005).
01 Breen article_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 418What explains this trend? Social scientists have not been as good at
explaining as they have at documenting and describing, but there is general
agreement that changes in educational attainment have played an important
role. On the one hand, there is now good evidence that, in the advanced
democracies, educational attainment depended less on class origins at the end
of the 20th century than it had at the start. Average educational attainment
increased and there was a narrowing of the gaps between people from
different social class origins in their attainment. In turn, greater equality in
education helped weaken the degree to which class destinations are linked to
class origins. 
But beyond this, it seems that among people who have higher levels of
educational qualifications, their social class origins play a weaker role in
shaping their eventual class destinations. This means that educational
expansion alone, even in the absence of any decline in educational inequality,
can make for more social fluidity. This is quite a mechanical process: if class
origins are less important in shaping destinations among highly educated
people then, as more people come to acquire higher levels of education, the
overall association between origins and destinations will decline. In several
countries, including the US, Sweden, France and Germany, this has been an
important avenue towards greater social fluidity.
V  TRENDS IN ABSOLUTE MOBILITY
Although social scientists devote a lot of time to measuring relative
mobility, absolute mobility is probably more salient in shaping an individual
person’s experience of intergenerational mobility. We are more likely to
measure our own mobility by a comparison of our position with that of our
parents, than by some complicated comparisons of where we are relative to
others, relative to where our father was relative to others 30 or 40 years ago.
Indeed, if we want to explain why patterns and rates of mobility differ across
countries or over birth cohorts – that is, why the flows from class origins to
destinations are different in Spain than in the Netherlands, for example, or
why these flows were different for people born in 1900 than for those born in
the 1950s – relative mobility is not the place to look. Certainly relative
mobility differs over countries and cohorts, but it does not account for much of
the variation we see in absolute mobility. 
Throughout most of the 20th century and up to the present day, most
people in the developed democracies have been socially mobile and the
majority of them have been upwardly mobile. Of men in the labour force in
Ireland in the 1990s, almost exactly two-thirds of them were in a different
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these, half had been upwardly mobile compared with less than one in six who
were downwardly mobile. The Irish experience is typical: mobility was the
norm and upward moves greatly exceeded downward ones. 
What has caused such high rates of absolute mobility? The answer can be
stated simply: economic change that led to the growth of some occupations and
classes and the decline, and even demise, of others. The way in which this
process has unfolded has been quite similar in most of the countries we have
studied. It has been driven by two major historical transitions: the first from
agricultural to industrial society; the second from industrial to post-industrial
society. During the first transition the share of farmers and farm workers in
the economy declined, while the share of manual workers, particularly in
manufacturing industry, grew. Agricultural labourers and small farmers
exchanged lives of hardship and in many cases poverty for the relative
security of jobs in car plants, shipyards and textile factories. Then, in the post-
industrial transition, the share of clerical, managerial, professional and
service jobs expanded at the expense of both agricultural employment and
manual labour. 
These transitions did not happen at the same time in all countries. By the
start of the 20th century Britain had long since made the transition from a
farming to an industrial economy, whereas elsewhere – in Italy or Spain, for
instance – this did not begin to occur until after World War Two. Furthermore,
the phasing of the two transitions also differed, so that in some countries there
was a prolonged phase of industrial society, while in others post-
industrialisation came hard on the heels of the decline in agriculture. As an
empirical generalisation it seems that the later a country embarked on the
transition from agriculture to industrialism the more rapidly that transition
happened and the more rapidly the country moved towards post-
industrialism. Today in Europe, the decline in agriculture is either complete
(as in Britain, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands) or well under way, and
between 1970 and the end of the century many countries saw a steady fall in
the proportions employed in manual work and a consistent growth in the
numbers of clerical, service, managerial and professional jobs. This was as
true of women as it was of men: indeed, in several countries the female class
structure is more post-industrial than the male.
VI  EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
What we mean by equality of opportunity depends on which opportunities
we are thinking about and what we understand by equality. As social
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earnings or occupational status or social class. But in any case, strictly
equalising opportunities for these, or any other relevant outcome, is 
a stringent requirement because it seeks to enact the principle that 
“… inequalities resulting from responsible choices are just, while those due to
factors beyond people’s control are not” (Swift, 2005, p. 257). 
There are two things that are important in this definition. First,
equalising opportunities requires us to draw a distinction between the factors
that are beyond people’s control and those that are not. As John Roemer (2009,
p. 31) has pointed out, “… conceivably nobody is responsible for anything and
in this case the theory would reduce to equality of condition”. Thus, a crucial
question is how and where we draw the line. Secondly, such a strong
programme is likely to be unattractive to many people because it means that
any advantages that accrue from various accidents of birth, including genetic
endowments and many of the things that parents do for their children, would
be regarded as contributing to inequality of opportunity and thus as standing
in need of modification or, where this is not possible, as things which the
unlucky ones should be indemnified against.
This immediately leads to a conflict between two moral principles:
equality of opportunity on the one hand and, on the other, the belief that
parents are justified, indeed obligated, to further the interests of their
children. But this is just a specific case of a more general issue: equality of
opportunity is only one of a set of values that individuals or societies might
hold. These include not only the value attached to children but also the value
attached to the family as an institution, individual freedom, economic
efficiency and so on. Insofar as these are not independent of each other, any
practical philosophy concerning one must be attentive to what its con  -
sequences would be for the others.
Are there factors for which individuals cannot be held responsible but
which may, nevertheless, properly lead to unequal outcomes? Certainly,
among social scientists there is widespread agreement that equality of
opportunity would not mean perfect mobility, if only because, under any even
minimally acceptable definition of equality of opportunity, there would be
legitimate mechanisms by which families could influence the fortunes of their
children and so generate unequal mobility chances (see, for example, Jencks
and Tach, 2005). 
But although this argument might be more congenial to those who favour
the idea that parents should be able to pass on some of their advantages to
their children, it still leaves open the question of where we draw the line – in
this case between those advantages and disadvantages we possess and for
which we are not responsible but which are nevertheless legitimately
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to illegitimate inequalities of opportunity. One ingenious attempt to draw the
line has been made by Adam Swift (2005). “(E)quality of opportunity” Swift
(2005, p. 263) writes, “does not require us to compensate for differential luck
of the kind that is constitutive of who people are. It requires only the removal
of the social barriers and silver spoons that prevent people from competing on
level terms with those constituted like them”. He continues: “The distinction
that matters … is between those mechanisms that, although a matter of
differential luck, are constitutive of the individual and those that are not”. 
What might be considered constitutive? Swift mentions genetic
inheritance and the development of certain personality traits, such as being
hard working and being able to delay gratification. To the extent that these
things are rewarded in the labour market – and we know that they are – some
degree of intergenerational persistence will occur and will, on this account, be
legitimate. 
One can think of cases in which consideration of other valued goals will
lead to legitimate departures from strict equality of opportunity. Many people
subscribe to the idea that society should operate on meritocratic principles.
The original conception of meritocracy, as set out in Michael Young’s 1958
book,  The Rise of the Meritocracy, is that merit equals IQ plus effort. IQ,
according to Young, is determined by the genetic lottery, effort is not, but both
deserve to be rewarded. This stands in contrast to the direct inheritance of
wealth and social position, both of which are considered illegitimate in Young’s
meritocracy. But this means that meritocracy, because it permits the
inheritance of IQ, is incompatible with strict equality of opportunity –
something which seems not to have occurred to politicians who espouse both.4
Let me summarise what I have to say about arguments concerning
equality of opportunity. Some moral philosophers espouse a radical version of
equality of opportunity which says that individuals should only benefit from,
or be punished for, things for which they can be held responsible. Such a view
is incompatible with other values that we commonly hold. Others adopt a less
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recently found a prominent place in the speeches of Mr Blair… The book was a satire
meant to be a warning (which needless to say has not been heeded) against what might
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dangers of what he is advocating. (The Guardian, Friday 29 June, 2001).
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from the possession of traits that they themselves acquired through the
accident of which family they were born in to. But in either case, distinctions
need to be drawn. In the radical version the distinction that counts is between
what we are and what we are not responsible for. In the less radical versions,
such as that proposed by Adam Swift, the important distinction requires us
also to identify those things that we are not responsible for but which are
nevertheless legitimately rewarded.
Deciding where to draw these distinctions, however, is a normative, not an
empirical matter: what is to count as equality of opportunity is a value
judgement. For sure, once we were given a definition of equality of
opportunity, social scientists might try to assess the extent to which it had
been met. But it would be helpful, to say the least, to know which definition of
equality of opportunity politicians who espouse the principle have in mind.
But what is more important is that, once we move away from the very strict
definition of equality of opportunity which says that all transmission of
valuable traits from parents to children is illegitimate, perfect mobility can no
longer function as a yardstick of equality of opportunity.
VII  SOCIAL MOBILITY AS A MEASURE OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY 
Now we come to the central point of my talk today: is social mobility a good
yardstick of equality of opportunity? To which my answer is going to be no:
even if we had a clear definition of equality of opportunity, it is not obvious
that studying social mobility would be the correct way to determine the degree
to which it had been realised. This follows from what I said earlier: social
mobility, in the sense of absolute mobility, is driven mainly by changes in
occupational structures. Increasing equality of opportunity, in as much as it
influences social mobility, will do so through greater social fluidity, yet social
fluidity and changes therein have, historically, been of rather minor
importance in shaping observed mobility flows, and are of similarly little
importance in determining inter-country differences in mobility.5 Politicians
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towards greater equality of opportunity, even supposing they have a clear idea
of what equality of opportunity might entail, are likely to be disappointed. 
This might suggest that we should look to social fluidity or relative
mobility rather than absolute mobility, for our measure of the extent to which
equality of opportunity had been secured. This seems plausible but, as I shall
show, it proves to be scarcely less problematic than using absolute mobility. 
One difficulty in employing social mobility as a yardstick of equality of
opportunity is that we are using measures based on unequal outcomes (in this
case the mobility that actually occurred) as indexes of inequality in the
opportunities to secure those outcomes. To return to the example with which I
began: if we only observed that one person had received $1,000 and everyone
else had received nothing would we be justified in saying that opportunities
must have been unequally distributed? Clearly we would not, because in this
case everyone had the same chance to win the money.
But suppose we observed the outcomes of the lottery repeated many times
and imagine that all the winners came from the front row of the audience.
Then we would have better grounds for suspecting that opportunities were
not, after all, distributed equally: in fact we could calculate the probability of
this happening by chance and this might lead us to conclude that it was more
than simply a matter of luck. Then we would want to know how this result had
come about and whether there was a legitimate reason for it. 
This is closer to the situation we face when we look at mobility outcomes
and observe, for example, that the lowest incomes and the worst jobs accrue
most often to people whose parents also had low incomes and bad jobs. It is in
seeking to understand how this comes to be so that the empirical and the
normative meet – the empirical investigation into the various mechanisms
that bring about such an intergenerational correlation and the normative
question of which of these mechanisms are compatible with equality of
opportunity. 
For the remainder of my talk I shall put the normative question to one side
and focus on the way in which social scientists try to measure the impact of
different mechanisms believed to underlie intergenerational mobility. What I
want to show, in the end, is that neither the measures of social fluidity used
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economists, are good measures of equality of opportunity, no matter what
definition of equality of opportunity we prefer.
The incomes or earnings or class position of parents and their children are
related because factors that are correlated with income or class position in
both generations, are also correlated among parents and their children.6
Intelligence provides a good example. People with higher IQs tend to have
higher incomes and so parent’s IQ is correlated with parent’s income and
child’s IQ is correlated with child’s income: estimates for the US suggests that
the correlation between IQ and earnings is around 0.27 (this may sound high
but it means that only about 7 per cent of the variation among people in their
earnings is due to differences in IQ).7 Furthermore, parents’ and children’s IQs
are correlated: parents, genetically and in other ways, “pass on” their IQ to
their children. In the US the correlation between father’s and son’s IQ is
estimated at anywhere between 0.4 and 0.75, meaning that up to half of the
variation in sons’ IQ is determined by their father’s IQ. Using some simple
math to put these things together, we find that the intergenerational father-
son correlation in IQ contributes between .03 and .05 to the overall father-son
correlation in earnings. In the US, the actual correlation between father’s and
son’s earnings is over 0.4, so this means that if IQ were the only thing that
parents passed to their children, the intergenerational income correlation in
the US would be about one-eighth of what it actually is. This is not a large
amount and, indeed, it is now widely agreed that the intergenerational
transmission of IQ does not account for much of the intergenerational
correlation in earnings. Furthermore, since not all of this transmission is due
to genes, the genetic component is even smaller (though genes have effects in
other ways too and the economists Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis (2002)
estimate that the total genetic component of inheritance accounts for about 30
per cent of the intergenerational correlation in earnings and about 22 per cent
of the correlation in incomes).
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6 Let A label the distribution of the factor in the parent’s generation and B in the child’s and use
X and Y to be the distribution of log income in the two generations. Then the intergenerational
correlation of log income decomposes to r(X,A)r(A,B)r(Y,B). The intergenerational elasticity, bYX,
decomposes as follows: 
sAB
bYX = bYBbXA –––
sF
2
where b denotes a regression coefficient and s denotes covariances and standard deviations. 
7 The estimate comes from Bowles and Gintis (2002). The consensus estimate of the impact of IQ
on years of schooling is around 0.5. Bowles, Gintis and Osborne’s (2002) meta-analysis of 24 US
studies yields an estimate of 0.22 for the partial effect of education on earnings and 0.15 for the
partial effect of IQ on earnings. The total effect of IQ is thus 0.15 + 0.53 * 0.22 = 0.266.
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to intergenerational mobility: these factors include wealth, personality traits,
such as shyness and impulsiveness, and physical characteristics such as
health, beauty, obesity, height and race.8 That is to say, any single factor that
helps to form the intergenerational correlation in incomes does this in two
ways – through its correlation with incomes in the parental and child
generations and through its intergenerational correlation between parents
and their children. In principle if any of these weakened, the correlation in
incomes between parents and children would decline. But not all of these
possible changes could be called increased equality of opportunity. Let me give
a few examples. 
Consider first a situation in which the intergenerational correlation in the
factor is constant but its impact on incomes declines. Race, or skin colour, is a
case in point. The correlation between parents and children in race is very
high and, in many countries, race continues to determine how someone fares
in life. But if its impact on income weakens over successive generations, race
will contribute less to the intergenerational correlation of incomes than it used
to (think of South Africa for example) and so, all else equal, that correlation
will decline. In this case, we should want to say that opportunities were more
equally distributed because race had declined in importance as a determinant
of income. 
But now consider education. Suppose that the parent-child correlation in
education remained unchanged but the income returns to education declined.
Then the parent-child correlation of incomes would also fall, but it is hard to
say that declining returns to educational attainment represent greater
equality of opportunity (at least under any reasonable definition). 
The opposite may also happen. The correlation of parent’s and child’s
education has, in fact, declined in many countries over the 20th century, but
at some periods the returns, in terms of income or earnings, to education have
increased, at other times they have fallen. A reduction in the parent-child
correlation in education might well be attributed to greater equality of
opportunity but this could be entirely offset in its impact on the
intergenerational correlation of income by increasing returns to education.
This would be an example in which, even focusing on the elasticity, or its
sociological equivalent, social fluidity, we would not register a change in
equality of opportunity even though there had been such a change. 
Finally, consider an example I mentioned earlier. We know that in some
countries origins and destinations are less strongly related among people with
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8 Some of these factors have a genetic component (race for example) but the way in which genes
affect the outcome is via the environment, as the example of race demonstrates.
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attainment increases, the correlation between origins and destinations will
decline because a greater share of the population has higher levels of
education. None of this has anything to do with changing equality of
opportunity: everyone has more opportunities but they are no less unequally
distributed.9
VIII CONCLUSIONS
In what I have said I hope that I have not given the impression that I
think equality of opportunity is not important. My point is the opposite:
because it is so important it is crucial that, when governments talk of their
commitment to it, we know exactly what they have in mind in order that we
can then measure its degree of attainment appropriately. But knowing exactly
what it is involves difficult normative questions for which social scientists
have no particular expertise. 
However, social mobility is not a good way to measure equality of
opportunity under any definition of the term. The reason for this is that social
mobility is a highly aggregated phenomenon: underlying it are many
complicated social and economic processes. In the case of absolute mobility we
have seen that it has been almost entirely driven by change in the
occupational structure. When we turned to measures of relative social
mobility, we found that, although they abstract from change in the
occupational structure, they may nevertheless vary for a variety of reasons,
some of which have nothing to do with equality of opportunity. So, even if we
could agree how much social fluidity would be compatible with equality of
opportunity, there would be no guarantee that, if a society reached this value,
it was because opportunities were more equally distributed than they had
been. 
There are many good reasons to study social mobility even if it is not
directly informative about equality of opportunity and there may be reasons,
distinct from equality of opportunity, why governments should promote social
mobility. But if we do want to know about equality of opportunity, we need to
focus directly on the causal impact of those things that affect it and which can
be changed by policy. Understanding the various mechanisms that underlie
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9 Solon (2004, p. 43), drawing on his model of inequality and intergenerational mobility, argues
that “If country A displays less intergenerational mobility than country B, this could be because
country A has stronger heritability, more productive human capital investment, higher returns to
human capital, or less progressive public investments in human capital”. Clearly, not all of these
reflect the degree of equality of opportunity. 
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towards equality of opportunity than simply focusing on social mobility itself. 
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